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Abstract—This paper aims to enhance the physical layer
security against potential internal eavesdroppings by exploiting
the maneuverability of an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). We
consider a scenario where two receivers with different security
clearance levels require to be served by a legitimate transmitter
with the aid of the UAV. We jointly design the trajectory and
resource allocation to maximize the accumulated system confiden-
tial data rate. The design is formulated as a mixed-integer non-
convex optimization problem which takes into account the partial
position information of a potential eavesdropper. To circumvent
the problem non-convexity, a series of transformations and
approximations are proposed which facilitates the design of a
computationally efficient suboptimal solution. Simulation results
are presented to provide important system design insights and
demonstrate the advantages brought by the robust joint design
for enhancing the physical layer security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) has drawn sig-
nificant interests in wireless communications, due to its high
mobility, on-demand of deployment, line-of-sight (LoS) air-
to-ground channel, and low cost [1]. Despite the special and
unique advantages brought by UAVs, the open and strong LoS
nature of air-to-ground channels lead to a high potential in
information leakage. As such, security plays an important role
in UAV networks. However, traditional encryption techniques
require a large amount of energy consumption due to their high
computational complexities [2]. As an alternative, physical
layer security against potential eavesdroppings is an effective
and energy efficient approach to address the security issues in
UAV networks by exploiting the randomness of wireless chan-
nels from the information theoretic perspective. Consequently,
physical layer security has been widely studied in the literature
for safeguarding wireless communications, e.g., [3]. On the
other hand, the high mobility and flexibility of UAVs can also
be exploited to enhance the physical layer security. Hence, a
thorough study on the role of UAVs in secure communication
systems is necessary.
Recently, the physical layer security in UAV systems has
gained increasing attentions in the literature. For example,
UAV-aided jamming scheme was proposed to handle the
security issues in [4]. Besides, joint trajectory and resource
allocation design was investigated in [5]–[7] for improving the
system secrecy rate with UAV-mounted base stations and UAV-
aided relaying protocols, respectively. However, the previous
works are all based on an assumption that accurate position
information of eavesdroppers is available at UAVs which is
over optimistic. In practice, obtaining such precise position
information is challenging and expensive in terms of hardware
cost and energy consumption. Then, based on the imperfect
channel state information of an external eavesdropper, a robust
trajectory design was proposed in [8] for providing secure
communications to the UAV-mounted legitimate transmitter.
Differently, in this work, we address the security issues caused
by an internal eavesdropper with a lower security clearance
level and only partial position information available, via ex-
ploiting a UAV as a mobile relay.
Inspired by the advantages and challenges brought by UAVs,
in this work, we study a robust trajectory and resource
allocation design for UAV-aided wireless communications to
enhance the physical layer security against internal eavesdrop-
pings. In the considered scenario, two ground receivers, named
Bob and Eve, respectively, with different security clearance
levels desire to be served by a remote transmitter (Alice) in
the absence of direct communication links. Specifically, the
receiver with a lower security clearance level (Eve) not only
imposes a certain QoS requirement on its own messages, but
also intends to intercept the messages with a higher security
clearance level. To this end, a UAV is introduced as a mobile
relay to meet the QoS requirements of different users and
to guarantee secure communications simultaneously. In many
practical scenarios, obtaining accurate position information of
a potential eavesdropper is usually difficult if not impossible.
As such, in this work, we exploit partial position informa-
tion of the potential eavesdropper to facilitate the robust
design by considering the worst-case. The joint design of
the trajectory and resource allocation is formulated a non-
convex optimization problem to maximize the accumulated
confidential data rate while ensuring Eve is only able to decode
its desired data. To facilitate the joint design, we propose a
computationally efficient suboptimal iteration algorithm based
on the successive convex approximation (SCA) approach [9].
Moreover, we numerically examine the performance of the
proposed robust joint design.
Notation: ‖·‖ denotes the Euclidean norm. [x]a denotes the
ath component of vector x. The distribution of a circularly
symmetric complex Gaussian (CSCG) variable with mean µ
and variance σ2 is denoted by CN (µ, σ2). E(·) denotes the
statistical expectation. (·)T denotes the transpose operation.
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Fig. 1. Illustration of a system model where Alice intends to serve Bob and
Eve with the aid of UAV as a mobile relay.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. System Model
In this paper, the considered secure UAV-aided communi-
cation system is modeled by a wiretap channel, as depicted in
Fig. 1, where Alice is the legitimate ground transmitter serving
two ground users, named Bob and Eve, respectively, with
different security clearance levels. Without loss of generality,
we assume that Bob has a higher security clearance level while
Eve having a lower one. In the considered scenario, the direct
communication links from Alice to Bob and to Eve are both
assumed to be not available. To address this issue, a UAV is
introduced to serve an intelligent relay providing the physical
layer security against potential internal eavesdroppings via
exploiting the UAV’s maneuverability. Moreover, we assume
that the accurate locations of Alice and Bob are known by the
UAV. In contrast, only the partial position information of Eve
is available for the trajectory and resource allocation design.
We define the maximum flight duration of the UAV by
T , which mainly depends on the battery capacity, the flight
control system, and the flight condition. The three-dimensional
(3D) location of the UAV at any certain time t is denoted by
q(t) ∈ R3. Notably, the continuous UAV trajectory leads to
infinite many variables, which make the problem intractable.
As a result, we adopt a commonly used approach in the
literature to facilitate the system design. In particular, we
discretize the maximum flight duration T into N time slots
with equal time length Ts, i.e., T = NTs. Notably, each time
slot is sufficiently small such that the flying speed of the UAV
within it can be assumed to be constant. Consequently, the
UAV’s coordinate at time slot n can be denoted by qn ∈ R3
for n ∈ {1, · · · , N}. The maximum speed of the UAV is
denoted by Vmax. Then, we have the maximum flight distance
of each time slot, i.e., D , TsVmax. For the sake of aviation
safety, the initial and final locations of the UAV are generally
predetermined, which are denoted by sI and sF , respectively.
Besides, the height of UAV is fixed at H . Accordingly, we
have the following constraints imposed on UAV in terms of
trajectory
‖qn − qn−1‖ ≤ D,q0 = sI ,qN = sF , [qn]3 = H, ∀n. (1)
We assume that frequency division duplex (FDD) protocol
is adopted. Specifically, the uplink (UL) transmission (from
Alice to UAV) and the downlink (DL) transmission (from UAV
to Bob and Eve) are separated in two orthogonal frequency
bands. In addition, the communication bandwidth can be
dynamically optimized and allocated to improve the spectral
efficiency. Denote the total bandwidth by BHz, which is
adaptively divided into b1,n Hz and b2,n Hz for uplink and
downlink transmissions, respectively, in time slot n. Hence,
we have
b1,n ≥ 0, b2,n ≥ 0, b1,n + b2,n ≤ B, ∀n. (2)
The UAV adopts the cache-aided decode-and-forward (DF)
protocol for information relaying. Here, we assume that the
cache equipped at the UAV is large enough such that there
will be no packet overflow.
Denote the locations of Alice and Bob in a 3D Cartesian
coordinate system by sa and sb, respectively. Without loss of
generality, the uncertain ground area of Eve is modeled by a
disc with radius de centered at se. According to the filed trial
results in [10], the line-of-sight (LoS) component dominates
air-to-ground channels in many practical scenarios, especially
for rural areas or at moderately high UAV altitude. Hence, the
air-to-ground channel between UAV and a ground node k at
each time slot can be accordingly modeled by
hk,n =
γ0
‖qn − sk‖2 , k ∈ {a, b}, (3)
where γ0 is the channel power gain at a reference distance of 1
m. To guarantee the communication security, we focus on the
worst-case scenario. In particular, the channel gain between
the UAV and Eve is bounded by
hse,n =
γ0
dse,n
and hwe,n =
γ0
dwe,n
, (4)
which are the upper bound and lower bound, respectively,
where
dse,n = ‖qn − se‖2 + d2e − 2deDG,n, (5)
dwe,n = ‖qn − se‖2 + d2e + 2deDG,n, (6)
where DG,n =
√
([qn]1 − [se]1)2 + ([qn]2 − [se]2)2 is the
projected distance on the ground.
B. Transmission Strategy
Denote the uplink signal in time slot n from Alice to the
UAV by xa,n which contains the messages intended to Bob
and/or Eve. The average transmission power satisfies
pa,n , E[|xa,n|2] ≤ PA, n ∈ {1, · · · , N}. (7)
The received signal at the UAV in time slot n is given by
yu,n =
√
ha,nxa,n + zu,n, (8)
where zu,n ∼ CN (0, σ2) denotes the additive white Gaussian
noise (AWGN). Without loss of generality, we assume that
the received noise powers at all nodes are the same. Then, the
uplink capacity from Alice to the UAV in time slot n is
CA→Un = b1,n ln
(
1 +
γpa,n
b1,n‖qn − sa‖2
)
nat/s, (9)
where γ = γ0/σ2 is the noise normalized channel power gain.
We denote Rbu,n and R
e
u,n as the coding rates from Alice to
the UAV for conveying messages to Bob and Eve, respectively.
Thus, Rbu,n and R
e
u,n are constrained by the achievable uplink
capacity, i.e.,
Rbu,n ≥ 0, Reu,n ≥ 0, Rbu,n +Reu,n ≤ CA→Un , ∀n. (10)
At the UAV, the received data from Alice is cached in
the buffer for forwarding to Bob and Eve separately in the
following time slots. Recall that Bob and Eve are both desired
to be served but with different secrecy clearance levels. To this
end, the two types of signals are transmitted in orthogonal
time slots. For the sake of clarity, we introduce a set of binary
variables ρn, where
ρn ,
{
1, the UAV only serves Bob,
0, the UAV only serves Eve.
1) ρn = 1: The UAV transmits confidential signal xb,n to
Bob but has a potential of leakage to Eve. The transmission
power is defined by pb,n , E[|xb,n|2]. The coding rate
of xb,n is defined by Rb,n nat/s. Due to the open nature
of wireless channels, the transmitted signal can be received
at both Bob and Eve. Their received signal equations are
given by yk,n =
√
hk,nxb,n + zk,n, where k ∈ {b, e}. The
corresponding channel capacity between the UAV and Bob is
CU→Bn = ρnb2,n ln
(
1 +
γpb,n
b2,n‖qn − sb‖2
)
nat/s. (11)
The potential maximum wiretap channel capacity between the
UAV and Eve is given by
CU→Eb,n = ρnb2,n ln
(
1 +
γpb,n
b2,ndse,n
)
nat/s. (12)
To ensure the communication reliability at Bob, the coding
rate Rb,n is constrained by Rb,n ≤ CU→Bn . Moreover, the
correspondingly minimum secrecy rate for xb,n in time slot n
is defined as
Rsn , [Rb,n − CU→Eb,n ]+. (13)
2) ρn = 0: The signal xe,n is intended to Eve from UAV
in time slot n with ρn = 0. Its allocated power and coding rate
are defined by pe,n , E[|xe,n|2] and Re,n nat/s, respectively.
Likewise the received signal with ρn = 1, for guaranteeing
reliable communications, we consider the potential minimum
channel capacity of xe,n at Eve, which is given by
CU→En = (1− ρn)b2,n ln
(
1 +
γpe,n
b2,ndwe,n
)
nat/s. (14)
Similarly, to ensure communication reliability at Eve, the
coding rate Re,n is constrained by Re,n ≤ CU→En .
Recall that the UAV acts as an aerial relay to cache and
forward data from Alice to Bob and Eve. Hence, additional
information causality constraints [6] in terms of signals to Bob
and Eve are imposed on UAV, which are given by
n∑
i=1
Rb,i ≤
n∑
i=1
Rbu,i and
n∑
i=1
Re,i ≤
n∑
i=1
Reu,i,∀n, (15)
respectively.
We note that the allocated transmission powers pb,n and pe,n
are limited by the maximum transmission powers of UAV, i.e.,
0 ≤ pb,n ≤ PU, 0 ≤ pe,n ≤ PU, ∀n. (16)
C. Problem Formulation
In this section, we formulate the resource allocation and
trajectory design as an optimization problem. In the considered
system, the UAV assists Alice to deliver a certain amount of
data to Eve for a given time duration T . We aim to maximize
the accumulated confidential data rate achieved at Bob while
guaranteeing a minimum required data rate for Eve to decode
its own messages. To this end, the resource allocation and
trajectory of UAV are to be jointly optimized. Mathematically,
the optimization problem is formulated as
P1: maximize
∆
N∑
n=1
Rsn (17a)
s. t. CU→Bn ≥ Rb,n,∀n, (17b)
CU→En ≥ Re,n,∀n, (17c)
N∑
n=1
Re,n ≥ RE, (17d)
ρn ∈ {0, 1},∀n, (17e)
(1), (2), (7), (10), (15), (16),
where ∆ , {∆1, {b2,n, pa,n, pb,n, pe,n, ρn}Nn=1} and ∆1 ,
{b1,n,qn, Rbu,n, Reu,n, Rb,n, Re,n}Nn=1 are the sets of optimiza-
tion variables. RE is the minimum required data rate for Eve
to decode its own message. The considered optimization for-
mulation is a generalization of existing ones in the literature.
For example, external eavesdropping, e.g., [7], and complete
position information of the eavesdropper, e.g., [5], are two
special cases of this framework with RE = 0 and de = 0,
respectively.
III. JOINT TRAJECTORY AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION
DESIGN STRATEGY
The considered optimization problem P1 is a mixed-integer
programming which is NP-hard in general [11]. In particular,
the optimization variables are coupled together resulting in an
intractable problem. To tackle P1 in (17), we first provide
some useful insights to simplify the problem at hand. Then,
we propose a series of transformations and approximations to
facilitate the design of a suboptimal solution.
A. Simplifications of the Optimization Problem P1
In particular, without loss of optimality, the uplink and
downlink transmissions in each time slot fully occupy the total
bandwidth, i.e., b1,n + b2,n = B, ∀n. This is due to the fact
that if the bandwidth allocation satisfies b1,n + b2,n < B with
strict inequality in some time slots, the objective function may
be further increased by allocating the available bandwidth to
the uplink and/or downlink channels subject to the constraints.
Then, to further facilitate the joint design, in the following
lemma, we discuss the optimal transmission strategy for secure
communications adopted at the UAV.
Lemma 1: If the UAV locates closer to Bob than Eve, i.e.,
‖qn−sb‖2 < ‖qn−se‖2 +d2e−2deDG,n, the optimal strategy
is to transmit confidential signal with ρn = 1. Otherwise, the
UAV either caches data from the uplink channel or delivers
data with a lower security clearance level to Eve.
Proof: This lemma can be proved by contradiction. Sup-
pose that the UAV transmits the confidential signal when it
is closer to Eve than Bob, i.e., ‖qn − sb‖2 ≥ ‖qn − se‖2 +
d2e − 2deDG,n, in certain time slots and achieves the optimal
solution. Based on the definition of the secrecy rate in (13),
the objective value keeps invariant even without power and
bandwidth allocation in these time slots. Hence, the original
resources dedicated to these time slots can be saved and be
used in other time slots to improve the system performance.
By exploiting this lemma, the objective function given in
(17a) can be simplified to
N∑
n=1
Rb,n − CU→Eb,n . (18)
We note that ρn is a binary optimization variable in P1 and
additionally coupled with other variables. Now, by exploiting
the binary property of ρn, CU→Bn in P1 can be equivalently
written as:
CU→Bn = ρnb2,n ln
(
1 +
γpb,n
ρnb2,n‖qn − sb‖2
)
. (19)
This can be proved directly when ρn = 1 and via the
L’Hospital’s rule when ρn = 0.
Furthermore, we introduce two auxiliary optimization vari-
ables ηn ≥ 0 and τn ≥ 0 to replace ρnb2,n and (1− ρn)b2,n,
respectively. To this end, two types of constraints are imposed
on the new variables, which are given by
τn = B − b1,n − ηn, ρn ≥ 0, ηn ≥ 0, ∀n, (20a)
ηnτn ≤ 0, ∀n. (20b)
These constraints guarantee that the UAV serves Bob and Eve
with orthogonal time slots. Notably, ηn and τn are coupled
in (20b) which is non-convex and to be addressed in the
following sections.
B. Transformation of the Optimization Problem P1
We note that the optimization variables are still coupled in
constraints (10), (17b), (17c), (18), (20b). In this section, we
transform the optimization problem P1 into its equivalent form
to facilitate the computationally efficient resource allocation
and trajectory design. To this end, we first introduce some
auxiliary optimization variables µa,n, µb,n, and µe,n to bound
‖qn − sa‖2, ‖qn − sb‖2, dwe,n from above, respectively. As a
consequence, some additional constraints are imposed on the
auxiliary variables, which are given by
‖qn − sa‖2 ≤ µa,n, µa,n ≥ 0, ∀n, (21a)
‖qn − sb‖2 ≤ µb,n, µb,n ≥ 0, ∀n, (21b)
dwe,n ≤ µe,n, µe,n ≥ 0, ∀n. (21c)
Inspired by the fact that a quadratic-over-linear function is
convex with respect to its positive inputs, respectively [12],
we introduce some new variables αa,n ≥ 0, αb,n ≥ 0, and
αe,n ≥ 0 to replace √pa,n, √pb,n, and √pe,n, respectively.
We then introduce a set of auxiliary variables θn ≥ 0 to
bound
α2b,n
dse,n
from above. As such, the constraint imposed on
the new variable is given by
α2a,n
θn
+ 2deDG,n≤‖qn − se‖2 + d2e, θn ≥ 0, ∀n. (22)
Based on the previous transformations, the optimization
problem P1 is transformed into its equivalent form, which
is given by
P2:maximize
∆2
N∑
n=1
Rb,n − ηn ln
(
1 +
γθn
ηn
)
(23a)
s. t. Rbu,n+R
e
u,n≤b1,n ln
(
1 +
γα2a,n
b1,nµa,n
)
,∀n,
(23b)
ηn ln
(
1 +
γα2b,n
ηnµb,n
)
≥ Rb,n,∀n, (23c)
τn ln
(
1 +
γα2e,n
τnµe,n
)
≥ Re,n,∀n, (23d)
α2a,n ≤ PA, α2b,n ≤ PU, α2e,n ≤ PU, ∀n,
(23e)
(1), (2), (15), (17d), (20), (21), (22),
where ∆2,{∆1,{αa,n,αb,n,αe,n,τn,ηn,µa,n,µb,n,µe,n,θn}Nn=1}
is the new optimization variable set. However, the objective
function (23a) and constraints (20b), (22), (23b), (23c), and
(23d) are still non-convex, due to the coupling variables. In
the following section, we focus on the approximations of these
non-convex objective function and constraints.
C. Approximations of the Optimization Problem P2
In this section, we convexify the non-convex objective
function and constraints via the SCA approach [13].
1) SCA Method Based on the First-Order Taylor Expan-
sion: We note that the non-convex functions in the constraints
(23b), (23c), and (23d) are desired to be approximated to
concave functions. To this end, the SCA approach based on the
first-order Taylor expansion is employed. In particular,
α2k,n
µk,n
is convex with respect to αk,n and µk,n, respectively, where
k ∈ {a, b, e}. Thus, for any fixed point in the rth iteration
αrk,n ≥ 0 and µrk,n ≥ 0,
α2k,n
µk,n
can be bounded from below,
i.e.,
α2k,n
µk,n
≥ R˜k,n , 2α
r
k,n
µrk,n
αk,n − (α
r
k,n)
2
(µrk,n)
2 µk,n. As a result, the
constraints (23b), (23c), and (23d) are approximated to
b1,n ln
(
1 +
γR˜a,n
b1,n
)
≥ Rbu,n +Reu,n,∀n, (24a)
ηn ln
(
1 +
γR˜b,n
ηn
)
≥ Rb,n,∀n, (24b)
τn ln
(
1 +
γR˜e,n
τn
)
≥ Re,n,∀n, (24c)
respectively, which are convex, since perspective functions
preserve convexity [12].
Moreover, the second term on the left-hand side of the
objective function (23a) desires to be approximated to a
convex function and the associated constraint (22) is to be
approximated to a concave one. To this end, by employing
the first-order Taylor expansion, the objective function (23a)
and the constraint are approximated to
R
s
n , Rb,n − ηn ln
(
1 +
γθrn
ηrn
)
− γ
− θrnηnηrn + θn
1 + γ
θrn
ηrn
,
α2b,n
θn
+2deDG,n − d2e≤‖qrn−se‖2+2r(qn−qrn),∀n. (25)
where r , (qrn)T − sTe . θrn, ηrn, and qrn are fixed points in the
rth iteration.
2) SCA Method Based on Arithmetic-Geometric Mean
(AGM) Inequality: Notably, constraint (20b) is bilinear with
respect to τn and ηn, respectively. For handling the bilin-
ear function, we adopt the SCA approach based on AGM
inequality. As such, the non-convex bilinear function is se-
quentially upper bounded by a convex one, i.e., ηnτn ≤
1
2
((
ηn
ψn
)2
+(τnψn)
2
)
,∀n, where ψn ≥ 0 is a fixed point for
tightening the upper bound, which is updated by ψr+1n =
√
ηrn
τrn
in the rth iteration. Consequently, the non-convex constraint
(20b) can be safely replaced by
1
2
((
ηn
ψn
)2
+ (τnψn)
2
)
≤ 0,∀n. (26)
Specifically, we find that the non-convex feasible set is approx-
imated by a convex set which only contains one possibility,
i.e., ηn = 0 and τn = 0,∀n. However, this possible solution
violates constraint (17d) for guaranteeing the QoS requirement
of Eve. To address this issue, we augment (26) into the
objective function via introducing a set of penalty factor
λn  0 to obtain an equivalent form.
Based on the previous approximations, the optimization
problem P2 in (23) has can be approximated to a convex one,
which is given by
P3: maximize
∆2
RS ,
N∑
n=1
R
s
n−
N∑
n=1
λn
((
ηn
ψn
)2
+(τnψn)
2
)
s. t. (1), (2), (15), (17d), (20a), (21), (23e), (24), (25).
The above optimization problem P3 is convex given the
fixed points and can be solved efficiently by off-the-shelf
convex solvers, e.g., CVX [14].
We note that λn is updated by adopting gradient descent
method [15]. Specifically, at the r-th iteration, λrn is updated
by λr+1n = λ
r
n + δn
((
ηrn
ψrn
)2
+ (τ rnψ
r
n)
2
)
, where δn ≥ 0 is
the rth step size.
Based on the concept of SCA [9], the fixed points are
iteratively updated in the rth iteration as
αrk,n = αk,n, µ
r
k,n = µk,n, ∀n, k ∈ {a, b, e},
θrn = θn, η
r
n = ηn, q
r
n = qn, ∀n.
Algorithm 1 SCA-based Algorithm for Joint Trajectory and
Resource Allocation Design
1: Initialize Γ01,  = 1, and iteration index r = 1.
2: while  ≥ 10−4 do
3: Update ∆2 with fixed Γr1 by (27);
4: Update Γr+11 based on ∆2;
5: Update  =
∣∣∣R(r)S −R(r−1)S ∣∣∣ /R(r−1)S ;
6: Update r = r + 1;
7: end while
8: Output ∆3 and RS
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Fig. 2. Trajectory of the UAV with different targets data rate of Eve, i.e.,
RE = 100 Mbps and RE = 50 Mbps with se = (4 km, 0.5 km, 0),
de = 0.3 km.
Therefore, we obtain the SCA-based iterative algorithm for
problem (27), as summarized in Algorithm 1, in which we
define Γr1 as
Γr1 , {{αra,n, αrb,n, αre,n, µra,n, µrb,n, µre,n, θrn, ηrn,qrn}Nn=1}.
Based on the results in [16], the proposed SCA-based algo-
rithm can converge to a stationary Karush-Kuhn-Tucker point.
Hence, the algorithm is able to achieve a suboptimal solution
of P1 with polynomial-time computational complexity.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we numerically examine the secure perfor-
mance of the proposed transmission strategy. In the simulation,
all nodes are located in a 3D Cartesian coordinate system.
Without loss of generality, Alice and Bob are set to be located
at (0, 0, 0) and (5 km, 0, 0), respectively. The initial and final
locations of the UAV are located at (-2 km, 1 km, 0.1 km)
and (6 km, 1 km, 0.1 km), respectively. The reference channel
power gain at distance one meter and the noise power are set
as γ0 = −50 dB and σ2 = −150 dBm /Hz, respectively.
The communication bandwidth is set as B = 10 MHz. The
maximum flight duration is set as T = 450 s. The maximum
speed of the UAV and the time slot duration are set as
Vmax = 20 m/s and Ts = 10 s, respectively. The maximum
power budget at Alice and the UAV are set as PA = 30 dBm
and PU = 27 dBm, respectively.
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Fig. 3. The maximal accumulated confidential data achieved at Bob versus
uncertainty of Eve’s location.
In Fig. 2, we plot the optimized trajectory of the UAV
against the potential internal eavesdropping. For the sake of
observation, the projected ground locations of Alice, Bob,
initial and final points of UAV are displayed with makers
while the uncertain area of Eve is shaded. From this figure,
we can observe that the UAV first tries to approach Alice
for data caching as much as possible, and then flies towards
Eve for completing data delivery mission. After that, UAV
flies away Eve to Bob and hovers above Bob for secure
communications with the best-effort. Finally, UAV flies back
to its final location with its full speed. Moreover, we find that
when the accumulated data rate requirement of Eve becomes
more stringent, the UAV has to spend more time and power
resources on serving Eve. For example, the UAV needs to
hover above the central point of Eve’s uncertain area when
the data requirement of Eve is high, e.g., RE = 100 Mbps,
while only flying close to Eve’s uncertain area with a relatively
high speed when RE = 50 Mbps. Finally, we find that the
cruising duration significantly limited the performance of UAV,
as UAV may not have enough time slots to hover above Alice
and Bob for data caching and delivery, respectively.
In Fig. 3, we compare the performance of the proposed joint
design strategy with two strategies which serve as benchmarks.
In fixed bandwidth strategy, the total bandwidth allocated to
uplink and downlink transmission is fixed and equally divided,
i.e., b1,n = 0.5B and b2,n = 0.5B, ∀n. In fixed time slot
strategy, the total time slots are equally allocated to Bob and
Eve separately. From this figure, we find that the proposed
joint design strategy always outperforms the other two. This
is due to the fact that the proposed joint design exploits more
degrees of freedom by adaptively adjusting the optimization
variables. For example, when the UAV approaches Alice for
caching data, the proposed joint design tends to adaptively
allocate more bandwidth resources to the uplink transmission.
Moreover, when secure communication can be guaranteed by
optimizing the trajectory, the proposed design would allocate
more time slots and power resources for transmitting confi-
dential data as much as possible. Furthermore, we find that
the maximum accumulated confidential data rate achieved at
Bob monotonically decreases with the increasing uncertainty
of Eve’s position. The reasons are twofold. With the increasing
uncertainty of Eve’s position, the UAV is forced to make a
longer detour and reduce its transmit power for communicating
with Bob, when it is close to the uncertain region leading to a
smaller secrecy rate. On the other hand, the resource allocation
also tends to allocate more time slots and power to convey the
messages to Eve for meeting its QoS requirement, which leads
to a further decreasing performance achieved at Bob.
V. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have investigated the robust physical
layer security against internal eavesdropping in a UAV-aided
wireless communications system. The optimization problem
is formulated as a generalization of existing ones to improve
the secrecy rate while guaranteeing a minimum required data
rate for the internal eavesdropper by jointly designing UAV’s
trajectory and resource allocation. To tackle the difficulties
brought by the formulated non-convex NP-hard problem, we
have exploited the properties of the problem to simplify the
formulation. Then, a series of transformations and approxima-
tions have been proposed to facilitate the design of a compu-
tationally efficient suboptimal resource allocation algorithm.
Numerical results have demonstrated the advantages brought
by the joint design for enhancing the physical layer security
in communication systems.
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